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Short supply and high prices for beans, rice, and other items in the basic-consumer basket have
created a nutritional crisis in Honduras. The skyrocketing price of beans is placing this staple
beyond the reach of the country's poor and has forced the government to reconsider its agricultural
policies. The price of red beans was US$0.36 per pound in March, rising to US$0.42 in April. By May,
there were press reports that many consumers, unable to afford beans at US$0.60 to US$0.75 per
pound, were buying by the bean.
In May, President Carlos Roberto Reina issued an executive decree directing the government's
agricultural- marketing agency (Instituto Hondureno de Mercadeo Agricola, IHMA) to buy 1,500
metric tons of red beans from foreign suppliers and the government's Suplidora Nacional de
Productos Basicos (BANASUPRO) to buy 191 MT in the domestic market. Natural Resources
Minister Ricardo Arias said these supplies would undercut hoarders and speculators because they
would be sold directly to consumers through BANASUPRO at below-market prices.
Agricultural groups and consumers called on the government to subsidize the retail price of the
imported beans because, at US$0.50 per pound, they were still prohibitively high. But Treasury Vice
Minister Gabriela Nunez said the government could not afford direct subsidies and that, in any case,
subsidy payments would end up in the hands of intermediaries and would not help consumers.
Nevertheless, price competition from BANASUPRO did not end the crisis, and commercial prices
continued to rise through August despite additional emergency measures adopted by the Reina
administration. Red beans were selling for as much as US$1 per pound in early August as both
beans and rice hit 20-year record highs.
Problems in the supply and price structure of basic grains is regional, with shortages appearing in
other Central American countries. Arias explained that some grain shortages are worldwide, and are
caused by the emergence of China as a major buyer and by other factors beyond the control of the
Honduran government. Still, Reina and the head of a special commission set up to meet the crisis
declared that the shortages and high prices resulted from speculation and hoarding in Honduras.
Justice officials warned that they would act against speculators who commit "economic crimes."
Other analyses pointed to climatic factors. Campesino leaders claimed that between 30% and 35%
of the current crop will be lost because of drought conditions and asked for government assistance
to increase plantings. But Arias said in July that the crop losses would amount to only 5% to 9%,
though he proposed that the government spend US$1.6 million to help growers replant and fertilize
the crop areas affected by the drought. As the crisis wore on, the president and his economy
ministers agreed that the problem was more complex, but they tended to list symptoms more than
to isolate causes. For example, Reina said in early June that the exportation of grains "was out of
control," and that agricultural production was only growing by 1.9% per year while demand was
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increasing at a 3.5% rate. He blamed low productivity on a lack of modern farm machinery and
technical assistance, high interest rates, weak marketing structures, and insecure land titles.
But other observers tied the shortages to fundamental errors committed by the government and
to the larger problems facing the economy, such as the oppressive payments on the foreign debt
and interest rates as high as 30%. Officials of both the agricultural workers union (Central Nacional
de Trabajadores del Campo, CNTC) and the business council (Consejo Hondureno de la Empresa
Privada, COHEP) faulted the government for failing to provide sufficient credit to agriculture.
Indeed, in recent years, the bulk of available credit has gone to manufacturing and the export sectors
and not to agriculture. According to Central Bank (Banco Central de Honduras, BCH) figures, credits
to the export sector grew from US$31 million in 1980 to US$558 million in 1995 an increase of 1,700%.
During the same period, credits to the agricultural sector increased from US$23 million to US$143
million an increase of only 522%. In March, agriculture received US$32 million in credits, while
industry received US$47 million and the export sector US$143 million.
COHEP president Juan Bendeck denied accusations that the private sector was responsible for
the crisis for not investing heavily enough in agriculture. Bendeck said that the shortage of credit
and a lack of government guarantees on investments had held back production. "If there is no
security to plant, there will be no production in this country," he said. However, it was not clear
that the shortage was the result of inadequate production. For one thing, government estimates of
production and consumer needs are unreliable. For another, an unspecified percentage of the last
crop of beans was exported to other Central American countries, especially to El Salvador. Bendeck
noted that if grains left the country, it may be that production was not the problem.
Economist Martin Barahona blamed the crisis on poorly designed agricultural policies. While
praising the president's move to treat the shortage as a national emergency, Barahona said that the
problem could have been avoided with a national production strategy. He took the government and
multilateral lending agencies to task for inattention to the agricultural sector. "What this [shortage]
shows is that the agricultural policies of the international organizations are ineffective, that they do
not resolve problems but instead complicate them," said Barahona.
Going beyond agricultural policy, Barahona condemned the government's "dogmatism" in
applying free-market theories to the nation's food supply on the assumption that the market would
automatically coordinate supply and demand at a reasonable price level. Faith in the free-market
model led to the unlimited export of basic commodities, the privatization of government grainstorage silos, failure to maintain an adequate grain reserve, and the belief that government planning
to guarantee production was unnecessary, said Barahona. On June 1, the government adopted a plan
to insure basic- grain supplies (Plan Nacional para el Abastecimiento de Granos Basicos). Under the
plan, the Central Bank will make US$10 million in credit from a US$45 million fund available for the
next growing cycle.
In addition, the government will subsidize agricultural credit by absorbing up to eight percentage
points in interest charged to borrowers by banks. Other measures include the regularization of
land titles and technical assistance. With the plan in place, the foreign grain purchases underway,
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and government purchases of all bean supplies in the Honduran market, Reina said that "the
worst of the storm has now passed." He admitted, however, that Honduras was not ready to
become nutritionally self-sufficient even though 65% of the land under cultivation is devoted to the
production of basic grains.
Later in June, Reina announced more measures to stimulate production. These include requesting
foreign donations of farm machinery, US$5 million in government credits from the Banco Nacional
de Desarrollo for small producers, the creation of a strategic reserve of corn and beans by the IHMA
with an initial US$5 million, and a new agency the Bolsa de Productos Agropecuarios charged with
promoting direct marketing of basic grains to bring more income to producers and to discourage
speculation. Many of the new plans and policies reflect a move away from the hands-off attitude
criticized by Barahona and others.
Economy and Trade Minister Fernando Garcia admitted that the government had moved too
late to avert the crisis and that it had failed to heed the warnings of the Asociacion Nacional de
Granos Basicos (PROGRANO) that shortages were imminent. Garcia said that the crisis came about
because of poor administration of the neoliberal system and that the government should now revise
the model. He proposed a temporary ban on exports of basic grains. Despite the government's
commitment to regional free trade, customs agents began enforcing such a ban by confiscating over
18 MT of beans bound for El Salvador. Arias has promised a new agricultural plan (Plan Agricola
para el Desarrollo del Campo), which is to be unveiled in the fall. But growers and campesino
organizations are already skeptical that the new plan will be an improvement over the current ones,
which they say have been failure. For example they argue that the US$45 million fund to put credit
in their hands was too little and too late.
As for the subsidy to help with interest on bank loans, critics charge that the reduction has been
closer to two percentage points than the eight promised in June. Furthermore, at 28%, Honduras's
current interest rates are far above those paid by competing growers in El Salvador and elsewhere.
Meanwhile, Central American agricultural ministers began meeting in June to devise ways of
heading off future crises in basic-food commodities. They agreed, among other things, to join the
regional fund (Fondo Regional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria) sponsored by the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB). Member states and donor countries such as Japan contribute a total of US
$200 million, which the fund then distributes to members in need of assistance with agriculturaldevelopment problems. [Sources: Reuter, 06/05/96; Agence France-Presse, 06/06/96; Agencia
Centroamericana de Noticias Spanish News Service, 06/06/96, 06/07/96; Tiempo, (Honduras)
05/29/96, 05/30/96, 05/31/96, 06/01/96, 06/03/96, 06/21/96, 07/02/96, 08/03/96, 08/06/96, 08/07/96;
La Prensa, 05/28/96, 05/29/96, 05/30/96, 05/31/96, 06/04/96, 06/18/96, 06/22/96, 07/25/96, 07/09/96,
07/12/96, 08/03/96, 08/05/96, 06/06/96, 08/07/96, 08/08/96, 08/09/96]
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